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Differences Lead to Differences:
Diversity and Income Inequality Across Countries
Abstract
This paper will test the relationship between income inequality and ethnic heterogeneity.
Although previous research has used ethno-linguistic fractionalization as a control variable in
inequality regressions, no research has focused primarily on an alternative measure of
heterogeneity – polarization. Using Gini coefficients from the from the World Income Inequality
Database and polarization data from Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005b), a pooled OLS
regression is run using data from 58 countries with 205 total observations. The results of these
regressions suggest that ethnic polarization does have a positive effect on income inequality,
even controlling for country characteristics and allowing for regional differences.
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I. Introduction
Income inequality refers to the distribution of income across different populations in a
society, specifically the gap between the income levels of the rich and the poor. The level of
income inequality differs for countries throughout the world, and researchers have often
questioned the causes and effects of these variations. Much research has studied the relationship
between income inequality and growth, but the determinants of income distribution are not well
discerned. This paper will test the relationship between income inequality and ethnic
heterogeneity. Although previous research has used ethno-linguistic fractionalization as a control
in inequality studies, no research has focused primarily on the measure of polarization or used
the data set this paper employs.
This paper uses the most recent measures for both income inequality found in the World
Income Inequality Database and polarization (Montalvo and Reynal-Querol 2005b). A pooled
OLS regression is run using data from 58 countries with 205 total observations. The dependent
variable used to represent income inequality is the Gini coefficient. The main explanatory
variable is the polarization index, and a number of control variables suggested in previous
research are included as well. The results of these regressions suggest that countries with higher
levels of ethnic polarization also have higher levels of income inequality. Regressions using the
more common fractionalization index are also run. The effects of ethnic fractionalization are
found to be diminishing, offering further support that polarization may be more important for
understanding income inequality.
II. Literature Review
The most well-known study of income inequality was done by Simon Kuznets in the
1950s. Kuznets (1955) finds that a country’s level of income inequality is affected by its state of
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economic development. As an undeveloped country experiences economic growth, income
inequality will initially grow as people leave the traditional sector for the industrial sector. But
when enough of the population has made this initial transition, additional development will lead
to less inequality. Since Kuznets’s initial proposition, his hypothesis has been studied by
numerous researchers using data from many different countries and many different time periods.
And like many topics that are studied extensively with econometric analysis, the results are
decisively mixed.
Higgins and Williamson (1999) find a Kuznets curve in their cross-country study of
inequality once they control for other variables. Barro (2000) also finds results supporting the
inverted-U theorized by Kuznets. However, in a study of industrialized nations since the 1950s,
Ram (1997) actually found the opposite of the Kuznets’s inverted-U; that is, income inequality
fell initially before rising again in the 1970s. For further information on the history of Kuznets’s
hypothesis, see Moran (2005)
Although the level of economic development may be the most studied determinant of
income inequality, it is by no means the only one. In addition to economic development, Kaasa
(2005) identifies four other factors that researchers commonly identify as possible determinants
of income inequality: demographic factors, macroeconomic factors, cultural and environmental
factors, and political factors. Of these, political and cultural factors directly relate to the
measurements of heterogeneity this paper investigates. However, demographic and
macroeconomic factors will be discussed briefly in order to present a full view of the research on
income inequality.
Kaasa (2005) classifies the demographic factors into a number of components such as
urbanization, share of children in the population, share of the elderly in the population,
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composition of the household, education level, education inequality, and education expenditures.
He reports that the only factor that has a consistent effect is education inequality, and it is
positively related to economic inequality. All of the other factors have been found to have either
positive, negative, or insignificant results depending on the study.
Macroeconomic factors include inflation, unemployment, financial development, trade
levels, and foreign investments. Similar to the demographic factors, Kaasa (2005) finds mixed
results within the literature for most of these determinants. Financial development is found to
have a negative effect on income inequality and foreign investments have a positive effect. All of
the other macroeconomic variables have been found to be either positive or negative.
While these elements should be considered as control variables, they do not obviously
relate to the heterogeneity characteristic this paper attempts to test. Heterogeneity by itself
cannot cause differences in a country’s income distribution. It is simply a characteristic of the
population. However, it can have an effect on other parts of society such as educational equality,
government expenditures, and institutional quality. These other factors are included under
Kaasa’s (2005) classifications of cultural and political factors. Many of these variables have only
been included in a few studies, but they have had significantly positive effects on income
inequality. These include land concentration, shadow economies, corruption, and natural
resource abundance. It is likely that any effect that heterogeneity has on income inequality is
caused by one of these factors.
The term heterogeneity has been used frequently in this report, but it is important to
define what is actually meant by this term. Within the literature and in this paper as well,
heterogeneity will be measured in two distinct ways: fractionalization and polarization. Although
fractionalization and polarization are related to one another, they are different concepts that look
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at different aspects of a population. Fractionalization measures the total diversity within a
population. It increases with the number of groups until it reaches a maximum value of one if
every individual in a society is from a different group. However, as the number of groups in a
society grows, the respective power of each group diminishes. There would be the greatest
amount of social conflict when there are groups that are the most powerful, i.e. two equally large
opposing groups. Polarization attempts to account for this power and social conflict relationship.
It reaches a maximum value of one when there are two groups of equal size before declining
with the addition of more groups. Its proponents suggest that accounting for group power in this
manner is a better way to capture potential social conflict.
Specifically, the fractionalization index is constructed using the following formula
(Alesina et al. (2003):
n

(1)

FRACi  1   s 2ji
j 1

where sji is the population share of group j in country i. This measurement gives the probability
of two randomly selected people selected from country i belong to different groups. Thus, a
higher value for FRAC indicates a more heterogeneous population. Fractionalization equal to
one would be perfect heterogeneity, in which all members of the country were from different
groups and zero would be perfect homogeneity, in which all members of society were from the
same group. This index can be calculated for various characteristics, but this paper will only
examine ethnicity heterogeneity.
Alesina and La Ferrara (2005) briefly outline heterogeneity’s possible effects on an
economy. They argue that heterogeneity can affect preferences, strategies, and actual production.
Furthermore, heterogeneity can lead to a lower provision of public goods because competing
groups do not want to assist one another. Empirical evidence of these effects has been shown
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internationally and within the US. Easterly and Levine (1997) report that the high levels of ethnic
diversity in Africa help to explain its low growth rate. They demonstrate that fractionalization
affects growth through a number of mechanisms including low schooling and political
instability. Alesina et al. (2003) also show that ethnic and linguistic heterogeneity can negatively
affect a country’s growth rate and the quality of their political institutions. Alesina and Glaeser
(2004) also show that the amount of social welfare spending in developed countries is negatively
affected by ethnic fractionalization A similar relationship between social spending and
fractionalization in the US is found when examining social expenditures across various
municipalities (Alesina et al. 2004).
As previously mentioned, there has been some debate in the literature over the use of
fractionalization as a representative measure for heterogeneity. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol
(2005a) argue that polarization can often be a better variable than fractionalization in
determining the social effects of diversity. Rather than measuring the total diversity in a society,
polarization measures the difference from a bimodal distribution. It is given by the formula:
(2)

n

0.5  s ji

j 1

0.5

POLi  1   (

2

) s ji

where sji is the population share of group j in country i. Polarization reaches a peak when there
are two groups of the same size in a society, but then its values slowly decrease as more groups
enter the society. It attempts to measure the strength of potential conflict, which is greater when
large groups are competing against one another. Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005a) use their
constructed polarization indexes to find that social polarization has a negative effect on growth
because it increases public consumption, lowers investment, and increases the likelihood for civil
war.

6

Within the United States, polarization has also been directly linked with income
inequality. Dincer and Lambert (2008) provide strong evidence that ethnic and religious
heterogeneity do affect income inequality even when controlling for education, corruption,
unemployment, and income levels. They test a model that finds polarization has a positive and
significant relationship with income inequality. They also find that fractionalization is significant
when it is modeled using a quadratic. In further tests, they find that the estimated effects of their
heterogeneity change with the inclusion or exclusion of a welfare spending control variable.
Therefore, they show that the amount of government transfer payments is one mechanism
through which heterogeneity affects income inequality.
No similar study focusing on the relationship between heterogeneity and income
inequality has been done with cross country data, although a number of studies have included
ethno-linguistic heterogeneity as a control variable. In Barro’s (1999) attempt to measure the
determinants of income inequality, he includes variables for both ethno-linguistic and religious
heterogeneity but finds that neither is significant in the model. Clarke et al. (2003) also include
ethno-linguistic variables in their model to measure the effect between financial intermediary
development and income inequality. In their regression results, they do find a positive
relationship between fractionalization and income inequality. However, they only find
fractionalization to be significant in their specifications using the generalized method of
moments technique.
III. Model
Despite the numerous studies done on income inequality, there is still not one accepted
model to use. Previous research indicates over two dozen variables that could be included in a
model (Kaasa, 2005). This paper closely follows a model in a study by Gupta et al. (2002) that
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studies the effects of corruption on income inequality and poverty. This model is replicated
because it is from a relatively recent publication, it features a variety of different control
variables, and most of the data used is easily accessible. Thus the model for this paper will be:
(3)

Inequalityit = B0 +B1 Heterogeneityi + B2 (Income Level)it +
B3 (Educational Inequality) it + B4 (Land Inequality) i + B5 (Corruption) it + u

Separate regressions using polarization and fractionalization as measures of heterogeneity will be
used. A comparison of the results will show which conceptualization is better suited for studying
income inequality. If polarization is significant, then it is likely that fractionalization by itself
will not be significant, but fractionalization and its quadratic will be significant. Diminishing
effects of fractionalization would suggest there is a certain point of fragmentation in society in
which income inequality is greatest, supporting the argument that the size of the relative groups
competing against one another matters more than the overall number of groups. Based on the
results of Dincer and Lambert (2008), it is likely that polarization is significant and has a positive
effect on income inequality. Thus, fractionalization is expected to have a positive but
diminishing effect.
The other variables are control variables that have been found to be significant in
previous studies. Traditionally, income level in the model has been modeled using GDP per
capita as well as its quadratic. This method tests for the Kuznets curve that was explained earlier
in the paper. However, the existence of a Kuznets curve is a highly contested issue within the
study of income inequality. The regressions for this paper were run using both a linear and
quadratic representation for GDP per capita. Because the quadratic was not significant in any
regression tested, a linear model is used for this study.
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Land inequality is another control for income inequality. Because higher land inequality
limits the opportunities for the people in a country in terms of employment and collateral, it is
predicted to have a positive effect. Education inequality should also have a positive effect on
income inequality. Education is theorized to be a determinant of wages, so inequality in this
should lead directly to inequality in income. Finally, corruption is also included as a control
variable. If higher heterogeneity is related to higher levels of corruption, then this could be a
possible mechanism through which polarization affects income inequality. Corruption is
expected to lead to more income inequality levels.
IV. Data
Because of the cross-country nature of this study, the data is taken from a variety of
sources. The main dependent variable in this study is the Gini coefficient. Although there are
other measures of inequality, such as Thiel coefficients, the Gini is the most common measure
used in cross-country studies of income inequality. The Gini coefficient is a number ranging
from 0 to 1, with 1 being perfect inequality and 0 being perfect income equality.1 The actual Gini
coefficients for this study are obtained from the WIDER World Income Inequality Database
(WIID). The database contains over 5000 Gini coefficients for 159 countries spanning from 1960
to 2006. It is a compilation of Gini calculations from a variety of scholarly sources usually using
in-country surveys for their calculations.
For Gini coefficients to be calculated, the income shares of parts of the population must
be known. However, surveys that inquire about these income shares often use different methods
and definitions. For example, the survey may or may not have national coverage; it can use the
household or the individual as the unit of analysis; it can be based on income or expenditure; it

1

The regressions in this paper actually scale the Gini between 0 and 100, but none of the inferences are changed
because of this transformation.
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can be based on monetary income or income that includes in-kind receipts and services. Before
the WIID was developed, most researchers used the Gini estimates from Deininger and Squire
(1998). Deininger and Squire outline a number or recommendations for choosing which
observations to include. Their guidelines of excluding non-representative surveys are followed in
the construction of this dataset. Furthermore, their concerns for variations in gross income
compared to net income, monetary income compared to non-monetary income, and income
compared to consumption have been accounted for using dummy variables.
For this study, the WIID was first filtered to only those Gini coefficients that were
nationally representative in terms of regions, household characteristics, and age. For consistency,
it was then filtered to include only the measurements that used households as the income share
and a person as the unit of analysis. This filtering resulted in instances where a country had a
number of Gini coefficients for one specific year. If they varied due to factors controlled for by
dummy variables, then each of the observations remained in the dataset. However, there were
instances in which countries had two distinct Gini coefficients for the same income definition for
the same year. When this occurred, the highest quality Gini was taken; if they were the same
quality, then the Deininger and Squire measure was taken; if there was no Deininger and Squire
observation, then the average of the two numbers was taken.2
The main independent variable used was ethnic polarization. The method for calculating
this polarization is discussed in a previous part of the paper. The specific measures for this index
come from the dataset used by Montalvo and Reynal-Querol (2005b), which is derived mainly
from the World Christian Encyclopedia. Although the exact dates for these values are not given,
Montalvo and Reynal-Querol treat them as stable across time for each country, and this study
will follow that methodology.
2

The three observations for which averages were taken are Finland 2000, Germany 2000, and Honduras 1999.
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Each of the other variables is a control variable that has been used in previous studies of
income inequality. The GDP measure is from the World Bank’s World Development Indicators
(2006) and corresponds to the year of the Gini estimate. GDP is in terms of Real GDP per capita
in terms of purchasing power parity.
The education inequality measure uses values from the Barro and Lee (2000) education
dataset commonly used in cross-country studies. The Barro and Lee data set has data for every
five years for most countries spanning from 1960 to 2000. Education inequality is calculated
using a method described by Gupta (2003) which takes the ratio of those not receiving any
schooling to those who have graduated from secondary or post-secondary school by age 15. In
order to obtain a more robust account of this measure, an average of education inequality is taken
rather than just using data from one time period. The average of two periods is taken, with each
being at least the same year as the Gini measure or before it.3 The natural log of this variable is
taken for easier interpretation and to correct for a few outliers.
A third control variable is a land Gini obtained from Frankema (2006). His dataset uses
in-country surveys of land ownership to calculate land inequality measures. For some countries,
multiple land Ginis are given. For each observation, this study uses the most recent land Gini that
is still before the year of that observation’s income Gini.
Corruption is the final control variable in the model. The corruption measure is taken
from the World Bank’s World Governance Indicators, which have been compiled very two years
since 1996. Of the six indicators provided in the data, this study uses the “control of corruption”
measure which measures “the extent to which public power is exercised for private gain,
including both petty and grand forms of corruption, as well as ‘capture’ of the state by elites and

3

For example, the measurement of the education inequality in Colombia for the 1998 Gini estimate would be
obtained by using the Barro and Lee data from 1995 and 1990.
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private interests” (World Bank 2007). These measures are created by combining a number of incountry studies and are then normalized. A positive score represents good governance and a
negative score represents poor governance. This study uses the corruption score from the year
that the Gini is from or from the year prior to the Gini.
Table 1 provides the summary statistics for the observations included in this study.
Although each dataset usually contained over 100 countries, having to match the datasets
resulted in a reduction to only 58 countries. Some countries have just one observation but many
have more than one. The earliest Gini used is from 1996 and the latest is from 2006. In all, there
are 205 observations. Table 2 provides a breakdown of the summary statistics by region. Table 3
provides a correlation matrix for all of the main variables.
V. Analysis and Results
For this analysis, unpooled OLS is conducted using SAS. Although this study does
analyze countries over time, the nature of the data makes this method preferred to using panel
techniques. Fixed effects cannot be used because the polarization measure does not vary across
time for the countries, and doing a transformation would subtract out the variable of interest.
Also, it is not logical to do a random effects study with this sample of countries. Attempting
random effects is also complicated because some countries have more than one data point for
each year (when there are multiple definitions of income inequality available).
When using OLS, one of the concerns for researches is heteroscedasticity. While this will
not produce biased results, it does invalidate the standard errors and subsequent significance
calculations. The regressions for this study were tested for heteroscedasticity using the White test
for heteroscedasticity. These tests showed that heteroscedasticity is present in the data.

12

Therefore, all of the regressions are calculated with standard errors that are robust to
heteroscedasticity.
Table 4 shows the results of the regressions of income inequality on various
combinations of the variable of interest (polarization) and the control variables. The first
regression shows the effect of polarization on income inequality using income, land inequality,
and educational inequality as control variables. Corruption is not included because it could
theoretically be a mechanism through which polarization affects inequality. As Table 4 shows,
this initial regression is significant and explains approximately 70% of the variation in the Gini
coefficients.
Regional factors are often quite important in cross country studies.4 In many studies,
including regional dummies may decrease the significance of certain variables. The results of the
third regression demonstrate this because both land inequality and GDP lose their significance
when regional dummies are included. The effect of polarization remains significant when
regional dummies are introduced, but its effect falls by half. If the average country were to
change from having no polarization to having complete polarization, the Gini coefficient would
increase by approximately 5 units rather than 10 units. Therefore, some of the effects of
polarization in the first two regressions are actually caused by regional differences rather than
polarization itself.
The second regression introduces corruption into the model without regional dummies to
see if it has an effect on polarization. Corruption is significant at the 0.05 level, but there is little
change in polarization when this new variable is added. Similar results are seen in the fourth
regression which includes corruption and the regional dummies. There is small fall in the
4

Here the base for regional dummies is essentially developed countries and one Eastern European country. Eastern
Europe is not included a dummy variable because only Poland had data available for each of the variables in the
dataset.
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estimated polarization coefficient (from 5.05 to 4.78), but it remains significant at the 0.05 level.
Corruption is the only control variable other than the regional dummies with significance at the
0.05 level. These results suggest that corruption is not a mechanism through which polarization
acts, but rather it has its own unique effect on income inequality.
The strength and significance of the regional dummies in each of the models indicate that
there are regional characteristics that are affecting the Gini measure. Because of the unknown
nature of the model, it is possible that polarization may also have different effects across
different regions. Therefore, a regression including interaction terms is run to test for this
possibility. The results of this regression are difficult to fully interpret. Polarization remains
significant and increases slightly for the average country. The only region to have a statistically
significant interaction term is the Middle East. It actually shows that polarization has a smaller
effect on income inequality for this region than in the average country. Also,adding the Middle
East’s coefficients for polarization and the interaction terms results in a negative number. This
suggests that polarization is not a major factor in the income inequality for this region. The
regional dummies for Sub-Saharan Africa and for South Asia fall by at least four units indicating
that polarization may account for some of the differences in Ginis for these two regions. The
small changes for Latin America and East Asia suggest that the differences that cause higher
Gini coefficients in these regions are not due to differences in the effect of polarization.
Overall, the results show that polarization does seem to affect income inequality.
Controlling for income levels, other levels of inequality, and regional differences did diminish
the effect of polarization, but it did not do so entirely. Corruption did not greatly mitigate the
effect of polarization. Polarization can probably account for approximately a five unit change in
the Gini coefficient. In this dataset, the range of Gini coefficients is from 24.4 to 66.6, but the

14

standard deviation is 11. Thus, going from near complete polarization like Jordan (0.982) to
almost no polarization like Norway (0.090), would increase the expected Gini by 5 units. A full
swing from non-corrupt to corrupt could have an impact of 10 units on the Gini. Just by being an
African or Latin American nation, the expected Gini rises by at least 8 units. Thus, the change
due to polarization is significant, but it does not explain a large amount of the variation in
income inequality.
In addition to using the polarization figures, an interesting test can be conducted by using
fractionalization measures as well. As mentioned earlier, fractionalization is often used as the
first indicator of ethnic heterogeneity, but it is very different from polarization. If polarization is
linearly related to income inequality, then there should be a quadratic relationship between
inequality and fractionalization. Table 5 shows the results of substituting fractionalization for
polarization. When fractionalization is modeled as having a linear relationship with income
inequality, it is insignificant. However, when a quadratic for fractionalization is also included,
both terms are significant at the 0.01 level. These results bolster the claim that there is a
relationship between income inequality and polarization.
VI. Conclusions
Income inequality has interested economists for over half a century. Many studies have
examined this problem and have found wide range of results. This study should be included in
that jumble of findings. Whereas heterogeneity had commonly been assumed to affect inequality,
actual empirical results have been mixed. The results from this study show that the use of
fractionalization rather than polarization may have been one reason why.
The results from this study show that income inequality is affected by polarization. A
complete change from no polarization to complete polarization would on average increase a
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country’s Gini by about 5 units. This is about half a standard deviation for the Gini coefficients
employed in this dataset. This effect is robust to the inclusion of control variables and regional
dummy variables.
Learning that polarization may affect income inequality is just the first piece of a large
puzzle. The most obvious question from this finding is through what mechanisms does
polarization affect income inequality. Because it is a demographic characteristic, it is obvious
that polarization alone cannot increase income inequality. Corruption was proposed as a possible
mechanism, but the results here do not support that hypothesis. More research is needed to find
out how polarization is related to other characteristics that may have a direct effect on income
inequality.
This study does have limitations that must be acknowledged. The first is the small
country sample size, and specifically, the exclusion of most Eastern European countries. As
stated earlier, the individual datasets used each had a large number of observations, but many
countries fell out because the data did not completely overlap. Using different sources or
different control variables that had more overlap may prevent this problem. Employing
alternative measures for income inequality or finding other data sources for polarization
measures would also further test the robustness of the relationship. Repeating the study with
different control variables has its own merit as well, simply because of the lack of consistency in
previous research. When most variables have been shown to be significantly positive,
significantly negative, or insignificant, then an appropriate model is hard to predict. Perhaps a
Bayesian approach similar to studies done for economic growth might be appropriate at
determining what the true causes of income inequality.
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While there is always room for further research on any problem, the results suggesting
that polarization does have a positive effect on income inequality are valid. Furthermore, this
relationship appears to be robust to many changes in the model. With more research, the reasons
for this can be better discerned and then possible policy recommendations could be crafted. At
the least, this study shows that researchers should consider using polarization as acontrol variable
for future income inequality studies.
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Table 1. Summary of Variables
Variable
Gini
Dummy for Consumption
Dummy for Monetary
Dummy for Gross Income
SSA Dummy
East Asia Dummy
Latin America Dummy
Middle East Dummy
Ethnic Polarization
Ethnic Fractionalization
Land Gini
GDP
Education Inequality
Corruption

Mean
44.73639
0.282927
0.24878
0.170732
0.092683
0.097561
0.419512
0.053659
0.5312
0.421165
65.60488
10129.41
-0.28371
0.189197

Standard Deviation
10.94003538
0.451523803
0.433364602
0.37719547
0.290697474
0.29744649
0.494687222
0.225894259
0.233922402
0.261107626
14.2087682
9279.043203
1.990109736
1.053535028

Minimum
24.4
0
0
0
0
0
0
0
0.0901551
0.045386
36.8
540.774963
-5.365976
-1.431661

Maximum
66.6
1
1
1
1
1
1
1
0.9824263
0.958587
90.9
34207.82
4.9374671
2.4619752
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Table 2. Summary of Variables by Region
Variable
SSA (10)
Gini
Ethnic Polarization
Ethnic Fractionalization
Land Gini
GDP
Education Inequality
Corruption
East Asia (5)
Gini
Ethnic Polarization
Ethnic Fractionalization
Land Gini
GDP
Education Inequality
Corruption
South Asia (5)
Gini
Ethnic Polarization
Ethnic Fractionalization
Land Gini
GDP
Education Inequality
Corruption
Middle East (4)
Gini
Ethnic Polarization
Ethnic Fractionalization
Land Gini
GDP
Education Inequality
Corruption
Latin America (18)
Gini
Ethnic Polarization
Ethnic Fractionalization
Land Gini
GDP
Education Inequality
Corruption
Other (16)
Gini
Ethnic Polarization
Ethnic Fractionalization
Land Gini
GDP
Education Inequality
Corruption

Mean

Standard Deviation

Minimum

Maximum

51.63511
0.526452
0.755613
57.30526
2128.58
2.677625
-0.68221

10.09784859
0.153658838
0.190457698
14.3781653
2573.041042
0.895978951
0.552590669

32.7
0.2710496
0.185026
36.8
540.774963
1.31907806
-1.1514638

66.6
0.7177831
0.958587
79
9419.12207
4.937467051
0.617476102

44.65208
0.587442
0.595782
47.66
4885.702
0.290117
-0.38251

7.425202587
0.071217294
0.196800703
5.91647121
1614.483784
1.083204337
0.346461821

30.8
0.4965057
0.36078
43.8
2955.69434
-2.2829666
-1.1726894

58.5
0.761617
0.842858
68
8660.820313
1.641472139
0.491939764

40.88889
0.471468
0.442556
51.07778
2009.166
1.716908
-0.46685

11.27091882
0.281039664
0.310799586
8.66584932
985.794273
1.096715222
0.31615389

27.6
0.1317742
0.0684201
41.8
1212.63708
-0.0342071
-1.0391018

61
0.7492799
0.901163
62.3
3625.534424
2.665214496
-0.17996227

38.41429
0.573082
0.373453
67.38571
4249.877
1.065555
-0.1284

3.188222374
0.306710817
0.229785827
5.337736278
1224.843064
0.294314927
0.225414084

34.5
0.1673397
0.087164
61.6
3100.49561
0.67947658
-0.4643364

44
0.9824263
0.75625
73
6251.55127
1.345018321
0.118143524

53.23579
0.645642
0.444724
76.50814
5442.079
0.231196
-0.3679

5.323172878
0.16811409
0.20789137
7.287882209
2145.809046
1.034244235
0.536274144

38.47869
0.2070293
0.047643
46.2
1798.40564
-1.1354862
-1.431661

63.7
0.9546801
0.7084
90.9
9115.474609
2.448298085
1.388079309

32.52614
0.365072
0.237862
60.87344
22226.91
-2.46298
1.502143

3.934037999
0.253300074
0.210927382
12.71517332
7048.801234
1.388266007
0.696253533

24.4
0.0901551
0.045386
39.2
6510.35352
-5.365976
-0.1870141

40.8
0.8707317
0.766822
79.1
34207.82031
0.988331164
2.461975194
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Table 3. Correlation Matrix
Gini

Ethnic
Polarization

Ethnic
Fractionalization

Land Gini

GDP

Education
Inequality

Gini

1

Ethnic
Polarization

0.460872579

1

Ethnic
Fractionalization

0.350185968

0.661858552

1

Land Gini

0.379756662

0.422880185

0.098642227

1

GDP

-0.638823173

-0.267010584

-0.368285952

-0.090638089

1

Education
Inequality

0.545695868

0.279711836

0.471408816

0.184325379

-0.750126001

1

Corruption

-0.660149438

-0.307214308

-0.429316095

-0.157116963

0.914036891

-0.777141926

Corruption

1
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Table 4. Regression Results for Polarization
Variable
Intercept

Inequality
Inequality
Inequality Inequality
41.03***
39.32***
36.44***
34.92***
(2.5061)
(2.6227)
(3.3921)
(3.5451)
Consumption Dummy
-8.59***
-8.25***
-6.47***
-6.41***
(1.1474)
(1.1321)
(1.0904)
(1.0621)
Monetary Dummy
0.02
-0.23
-1.18
-1.33*
(0.9467)
(0.8892)
(0.7852)
(0.7428)
Gross Income Dummy
4.29***
4.79***
4.38***
4.71***
(1.066)
(1.1064)
(1.0519)
(1.0428)
Ethnic Polarization
10.4***
9.81***
5.05**
4.78**
(2.208)
(2.1049)
(1.9134)
(1.877)
GDP
-0.00064*** -0.00038*** -0.00012
0.000063
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
Education Inequality
0.81**
0.49
0.54
0.23
(0.3168)
(0.3474)
(0.4092)
(0.4304)
Land Gini
0.1***
0.1***
-0.01
-0.01
(0.0356)
(0.0351)
(0.0498)
(0.0488)
Corruption
--2.86**
--2.15**
-(1.3023)
-(1.0247)
SSA
--15.21***
15.57***
--(3.1257)
(3.157)
East Asia
--8.07***
7.88***
--(2.4097)
(2.4135)
South Asia
--4.76
5.29
--(3.5391)
(3.6083)
Middle East
--6.17**
6.9***
--(2.4742)
(2.4455)
Latin America
--15.2***
14.96***
--(1.8956)
(1.9124)
Polarization * SSA
--------Polarization * East Asia
--------Polarization * South Asia
--------Polarization * Middle East
--------Polarization * Latin America --------Observations
205
205
205
205
R-squared
0.6962
0.7054
0.7848
0.7895
F stat
67.79
62.06
62.99
59.87
Standard errors are reported below the coefficient estimates in parenthesis
*** 0.01 significance, ** 0.05 significance, * 0.10 significance

Inequality
35.53***
(3.4873)
-6.52***
(1.1007)
-1.4*
(0.7365)
4.63***
(1.0278)
5.72**
(2.6295)
0.000054
(0.0001)
0.3
(0.4287)
-0.02
(0.048)
-2.19**
(1.0692)
11.17
(7.4701)
8.52
(10.4535)
1.67
(3.8983)
11.73***
(2.4894)
16.23***
(2.1455)
6.86
(12.5237)
-2.31
(16.72)
6.18
(9.248)
-9.46***
(3.0493)
-2.86
(3.3255)
205
0.7887
43.31
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Table 5. Regression Results for Fractionalization
Variable
Intercept

Inequality
Inequality
33.58***
32.86***
(3.1062)
(3.3786)
Consumption Dummy
-5.53***
-6.17***
(1.0742)
(1.0665)
Monetary Dummy
-1.33
-1.17
(0.941)
(0.7851)
Gross Income Dummy
5.15***
4.94***
(1.1329)
(1.0927)
Ethnic Fractionalization
-0.97
13.31*
(1.8317)
(7.2579)
Ethnic Fractionalization Squared
--17.25*
-(8.6114)
GDP
0.000091
0.00012
(0.0001)
(0.0001)
Education Inequality
0.085
0.05
(0.3882)
(0.434)
Land Gini
0.02
0.02
(1.8327)
(0.0457)
Corruption
-2.21**
-2.81**
0.9557
(1.0658)
SSA
17.75***
18.76***
(2.7197)
(3.3171)
East Asia
10.28***
9.71***
(2.2423)
(2.4204)
South Asia
6.98**
6.93*
(2.7388)
(3.7203)
Middle East
6.54***
7.84***
(2.04)
(2.4499)
Latin America
16.79***
15.75***
(1.8871)
(1.8956)
Observations
205
205
R-squared
0.7830
0.7885
F stat
57.63
55.32
Standard errors are reported below the coefficient estimates in parenthesis
*** 0.01 significance, ** 0.05 significance, * 0.10 significance
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